On Colonialism and Lesser Britain
Behind the bluster that has sought, somewhat over-anxiously, to articulate the Scottish Referendum result announced on 19th September, 2014 as being in some way “definitive”, there is an uncomfortable Unionist problem; even Unionists do not seem to believe their own story of triumph. The conventional question in Unionist media, endlessly and rhetorically repeated with the same populist gloss, amounts to the following: what is it that Yes voters do not understand about ‘No’? Indeed in a curiously perverse turning of the world upside-down, it is the losers of the Referendum that are now being accused, gratuitously, of unseemly triumphalism.
One mischievous form of answer might be to observe that given the result of the referendum, and the enduring existence of the Union; why do Unionists feel the need to ask such a question? Simon Jenkins, however has provided a more reasoned response in ‘We must heed calls for self-rule, or the union is doomed’ (Guardian, 17th December, 2014); but only to reveal Unionism’s inarticulate exasperation with the discovery of what victory actually meant; a Unionist victory which is anything but “definitive”.
Jenkins’ explanation for the Pyrrhic nature of the Unionist victory is that the referendum was not a final answer, but rather part of a process. We may think such a considered process may have required first, the rebuffed two-question referendum to provide the required momentum for appropriate, measured constitutional change that took into account the heartfelt wishes of voters (along with a reference to DevoMax), only to discover that this is just the memory of events that everyone in Westminster is now so eager to forget altogether: but rather than dwell on past Unionist blunders, let us jump ahead to the point at which Jenkins reveals where he wishes this staged process to lead: and it turns out to be DevoMax, power-sharing and, according to Jenkins, like “all big countries”, some kind of British ‘Federation’.
We may ask with some surprise, just what sort of “federation” is the UK? Of course we know the answer; for most of us did not know that the UK was actually a ‘federation’ at all (neither confederation nor federal state), or indeed that it had ever claimed to be a federal state; but rather, that quite deliberately the ‘Union’ was designed to be precisely the opposite; an “incorporating union”. For those still in doubt, the words of AV Dicey (1835-1922), Britain’s most influential constitutional lawyer of the late 19th/early 20th century from his notably, but perhaps not entirely accidentally titled, “England’s case against home rule” (1886), in which Dicey argued against Irish Home Rule, may prove usefully unambiguous:
“The federalism, again, of America or of Switzerland is the consequence of the existence of the States which make up the Federation. The United Kingdom does not consist of States.” (Ch.IV, p.53)
Dicey’s principle objections to the prospect of the innovation of federalism in Britain are nothing to do with democracy, equity or accountability, but almost wholly because of his opinion that it will produce a diminution of power; the power of Parliament, the power of England at home and abroad, the power of the British Empire. Federalism represents a “fundamental revolution” (Ch.VII, p.191) and the resistance to fundamental, federalist overhaul of the constitution is palpable.
It is however, quite remarkable the facility with which Unionists seize on Federalism as their first, and often last, favoured line of defence of the Union, as if it existed already and they did not ever really believe in ‘incorporation’ at all; only, and equally seamlessly, to adopt a contradictory position over Europe, lurching off in the opposite direction to denounce Federalism as a kind of nasty EU plot to defeat stout, hard-won British liberty. They do not even notice, that anyone else might notice, the obvious rational lacuna or the hopeless muddle.
If the UK was a ‘federation’, frankly in Scotland we probably wouldn’t be in this mess; but then, it wouldn’t be ‘Britain’ either, would it? Leaving Unionist blunders and non-sequiturs aside however, let us allow Jenkins to develop the idea of the Referendum as a “process”, in order to discover his ultimate destination:
“That process is clearly one of ever greater separation for the component parts of the United Kingdom, a separation that was obvious from the day in 1921 when Ireland began to dismantle the “first British empire”. It did so not because Irish people really wanted it, but because the London government was so incompetent at regional autonomy”.
Ah, history! It is unfortunate perhaps that Jenkins’ most obvious problem, as we try to sew together the disparate thoughts he has scattered so indulgently around his article, is that he does not appear to understand the implications of his own position, or the reason that ‘London Government’ has been, throughout its history; so obtuse, so obdurate, so hapless that it continually loses (forever) what Jenkins believes is part of ‘itself’; and yet, it cannot change, or learn from history, or prevent itself from making the same mistake over, and over, and over again…. ….: which leaves us to muse whether the Union is perpetually living out the fable of the Scorpion and the Frog?
In order to understand the can of worms he has so determinedly opened, Jenkins perhaps should have first read the brilliant historian Richard Bourke on the nature of the underlying problem of “autonomy”, “history”, “empire” and British government, which Bourke addressed with magisterial clarity in his Historical Journal paper, ‘Pocock and the Presuppositions of the New British History’ (2010). What Bourke reveals in this paper; a contribution that should be of far wider interest than professional historians alone, if not required reading for all (including Simon Jenkins); is the reason why Britain never, ever manages to solve Jenkins’ problem of autonomy, but instead seems to this reader fated to play out the destructive role of the Scorpion in the fable; and it appears now, to play it to the end of history.
Bourke deconstructs the ‘New British History’ thesis in a historical context that, conveniently for us, reflects the unintended political consequences of Jenkins’ 1921 starting-point in Ireland; the fall of Stormont in March, 1972. Within Britain, this 1972 outcome produced what Bourke refers to as ‘Ulsterization’, by which is intended a generic term describing British Imperial history, and thus is a mere identifier of a particular historical process. Ulsterization for Bourke is therefore not a phenomenon peculiar to Ulster, or to one period in British history, or to one place; rather it is a political phenomenon distinctive in British history, or more precisely the phenomenon of Ulsterization reveals the underlying nature of Britain itself.
The process of Ulsterization is typically best seen and described in periods of British imperial retrenchment affecting settler societies, from Northern Ireland to New Zealand, from the 18th to the 20th century: but a process that falls outside the scope of contractual theories of government. Ulsterization represents a one-sided exchange, a non-reciprocal commitment in which an asymmetrical relationship is formed between supplicant periphery and imperial centre, in which the settler-society expresses its loyalty (to Britain or Empire) in terms of what Bourke describes as being essentially a “unilateral pact of submission”.
We may, I think, suggest that Jenkins is not proposing Ulsterization as the solution for Scotland. Perhaps his position, as exemplified by his remarks about Ireland, is closer to the New British History, which in Pocock’s hands pursues a historical understanding of the development of British citizenship (‘civic virtue’ for Pocock, albeit in an Empire of ‘subjects’) on an imperial, global canvas, and in critical response to the end of Empire and the threat of an Europeanisation programme to British autonomy that followed accession to the EU (EEC) in 1973; if it is also neo-Seeleyan, then that was Pocock’s own characterisation, in reference to the historian JR Seeley (1834-95), in such works as The Expansion of England (1883). Seeley sought a deeper union, a meaningful commonwealth across the Empire. He wrote in ‘The Expansion of England’:
“What is the good of colonies ? That question implies that we think of a colony, not as part of our State, but as a possession belonging to it. For we should think it absurd to raise such a question about a recognised part of the body politic. Who ever thought of inquiring whether Cornwall or Kent rendered any sufficient return for the money which we lay out upon them, whether those counties were worth keeping?” (p.74)
Seeley did not consider ‘Greater Britain’ (a phrase borrowed from Dilke, but not the latter’s idea of ‘Saxondom’; a reminder however that late-19th century British intellectual life became awash with the unfortunate, abrasive, hubris-laced, late-Darwinist folly of eugenics) to be an Empire, but “a vast English nation”; a concept not without its dangers, which his own choice of words did not always avoid. He was however, acutely aware of imperial failure, the loss of the American colonies; drawing the lesson from such experiences that an enduring Empire would require to develop the idea of mutual respect in order to prosper. The capacity to develop a new, evolving relationship between province or colony and imperial centre, which Bourke describes in adaptive, evolutionary terms, sought to discover a new sense of a ‘Greater Britain’ emerging from the dynamics of such exchanges that at least potentially seem to transcend an otherwise commonplace British nation-state.
There is something nostalgic, almost melancholic about the New British History’s neo-Seeleyism. For Bourke, it seems that Pocock presents a dialectical view of Britain in which the development of an imperial Great Britain through a process of anglicised assimilation dynamically produces a countervailing reaction against anglo-assimilation among settler communities or provinces, rather than one-way submission; something actually different from the British original, or of Ulsterization is possible; a synthesis – a Greater Britain, a higher, trans-oceanic calling. Let us call this synthesis (to use Bourke’s words) a compromise or stalemate, because the synthesis stands for an underlying tension; and behind the tension there is always a stark binary option threatening to end it; independence for the settler, ‘cut-and-run’ for the Imperial centre. The New British History struggles to account for the resilience of the expectation of Imperial assimilation and anglicisation, the demand for submission, or the facility, increasingly over time, the alacrity with which the Empire withdrew. Resistance to complete assimilation (or perhaps this was settler society reaction to a lack of ‘central’ vision or at least of an attractive, compelling or competent approach to assimilation) led to the reversal of 1776, the violent and sudden loss of America.
We may also think of other ways resistance to assimilation was displayed; more typical of imperial priorities when confronted by a challenge to authority than the United States precedent, perhaps, is the slow leakage towards an uncontested separation by the ‘old’ colonies (Canada, Australia, New Zealand); characteristically if perhaps perversely viewed from the British perspective, as the line of least imperial resistance – withdrawal. This response is perhaps what the Empire chose to learn from the bitter blow of 1776; at least in the American or Australasian continents. Adam Smith acknowledged that accepting the loss of America was the sensible solution. We may notice that his equanimity on the matter was notably remarkable for being maintained, in the midst of, and in spite of the fact that, the Tobacco Lords of Glasgow (the transatlantic Banks or Hedge Funds of their day, with financial risks and profits to match) were confronted by the American tobacco planters seizing the opportunity presented by revolution, to default on their huge debts to Glasgow, overnight.
Hume subscribed vigorously to the same opinion as Smith; indeed his radicalism on this matter, his support for the Revolutionaries, albeit permeated with his philosophical scepticism, was an inspiration for Madison, Jay and Hamilton in ‘The Federalist Papers’ (1788); which ends the final paper with an anonymous quotation from Hume’s ‘Essays’ and a tribute to the unnamed writer as “a lesson of moderation to all sincere lovers of the Union”. This fulsome tribute has already left concern for Imperial objections to the American Revolution far behind in the ozymandian dust of a forgotten history; Madison and his colleagues use the wisdom of Hume in this peroration to counter the threat of factionalism among the individual States of the new Union. Hume would have enjoyed the irony, had he lived to see it.
It was Home Rule in Ireland, but Home Rule in principle, that undermined Seeley’s argument, and it was only when the issue of Home Rule was raised close to home that the implicit nature of Greater Britain’s limitations, the narrow interpretation of the imperialist venture, hiding behind the vanity of ‘assimilation’ or the euphemism of ‘withdrawal’, was given explicit form. In Dicey’s take on incommensurability in ‘England’s case against home rule’, he states baldly that:
“I entertain the firmest conviction that any scheme for Home Rule in Ireland involves dangerous if not fatal innovations on the Constitution of Great Britain.” (Preface, p.4)
The book that followed is a 311 page explanation of his reasons for this uncompromising position. There are no compromises in Dicey’s constitution: it is either Ulsterization or independence (withdrawal). At its heart this is a statement about power, drafted by the hand of a lawyer rather than engaged by the mind of a broader thinker of human nature or of the dynamics of human or institutional engagement, and certainly not written by a philosopher:
“Under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the shams of the British constitution, there lies latent an element of power which has been the true source of its life and growth. This secret source of strength is the absolute omnipotence, the sovereignty, of Parliament.” (Ch.VII, p.168)
The thought is not free of illusions, but the word “sham” is not used carelessly. The constitution is a sham; the reality is “latent”. For Dicey sovereignty is absolute:
“Hence, it has been well said by the acutest of foreign critics that the merit of the English constitution is that it is no constitution at all…. …. Thus freedom has in England been found compatible at crises of danger with an energy of action generally supposed to be peculiar to despotism. The source of strength is, in fact, in each case the same. The sovereignty of Parliament is like the sovereignty of the Czar. It is like all sovereignty at bottom, nothing else but unlimited power;” (Ch.VII, p.169)
I will pass no further comment on the precise meaning of the tem “unlimited”, save to offer some level of mild scepticism about its operational efficacy. The problem such a statement makes for a statesman in the real world, and in a retreating Empire is simple; how do you craft a constitutional compromise with a province intent on Home Rule or independence, from a position of relative weakness, in a constitution that does not recognise the issue? It is easier simply to reduce the state and maintain the constitution than to meet the challenge. Or to express this differently; an Empire has been won and lost and the constitution is unchanged. For the constitutional lawyer nothing has changed, and there is nothing to see; but perhaps Hamlet provides an illuminating insight into the prospects for such a static, inert State; “I could be bounded by a nut-shell, and count myself a king of infinite space”.
Diceyism is not consonant with Pocock’s neo-Seeleyian, Harringtonian vision, but at the same time the New British History cannot account adequately for the authenticity, the persistence, the implicit authority of Dicey’s relentless emphasis on the integrity of Westminster sovereignty, or for its dogged resilience long after Dicey’s death. Ironically on the same issue of Ireland, neither could Seeley; indeed he seems to have crossed the floor and joined Dicey; Seeley opposed Irish Home Rule and defended the Imperial status quo on Irish independence, and received an approving letter from Dicey for his efforts; they even appeared together on the same Liberal Unionist platform. With Ireland, Seeley’s vision of Greater Britain begins to unravel. The sham consitution survives intact; but everyone else, save England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Falklands and a few other isolated dependencies known to few outside the FCO, has simply left.
The British “imperial secret” is thus finally revealed by Dicey: Bourke argues that when the decisive crisis between peripehery and imperial centre arises, in Britain’s case, and in contradistinction with the Roman Empire, where the Imperial destiny and the affairs of the provinces are deemed inseparable, in the case of Imperial Britain the security of government is promptly disengaged from the affairs of the provinces. What is finally and alone inviolate is Westminster sovereignty. This is what is meant by British exceptionalism.
Britannia leaving Hong Kong with the Heir to the Throne and the Governor of Hong Kong on board was an extraordinary, solemn and very British ritual; unconsciously celebrating the continuity of this detached, sovereign Lesser Britain. In the end Britannia always sails away from its dependencies and into the sunset, when these possessions can no longer be identified as ‘dependent’. The faint, etiolated reverse-image of Britannia steaming away from Hong Kong is of a ghostly, remote, swashbuckling, privateer-adventurer opportunistically seizing a new British possession over the heads of bewildered inhabitants: finally and theatrically, rich in symbolism, Britannia rings down the curtain on empire. The escape and return home have been negotiated, content in the knowledge that Westminster sovereignty has been rescued, intact and unblemished by the collapse of empire.
The gloss is provided to the world, and to the British people that for British colonial possessions this is the constitutional analogy of ‘growing-up’; the condescending and complacent view that the Mother of Parliaments knows best how, when, and who to let go. The critical sub-text however is that in Lesser Britain the only alternative to ‘withdrawal’ is Ulsterization. Great Britain, it seems, is an evolutionary dead-end. All that seems left now is the slow death of Lesser Britain, from the inside-out.
I had to force myself to read this, it very hard to grasp some of the language used, thank goodness for online dictionaries, but having read it and understood some, if not most of the points, can I just say amazing use of language wonderful piece. I think I see the sun-setting as we speak…. 🙂
You’re not the only one who was glad to have online dictionaries to hand. Brilliant article though!
I appreciated this article but I did think it could be far better expressed! Better sentence structure!
Jenkins doesn’t actually mention devo max. You are imputing this to him. He mentions federalism and though he doesn’t define it, it is clear he means fiscal autonomy and fuller powers than Scotland has at present as for instance when he refers to the US constitution by which Texas does not tell Colorado to re-write its drugs laws or when Madrid doesn’t tell the Basques about their taxes.
It’s equally clear Jenkins misunderstands that fiscal autonomy won’t be coming to Scotland any time soon as when he fondly imagines we will have fiscal responsibility for income tax and that this will give us something significant. Smith’s proposals will only enable us to control 30% of our revenue. And what about collection? That’s a big question for me. Setting up the fiscal machinery to gather tax directly in Scotland as is being set up at the moment for the stamp duty would be a huge step forward in the way of federalism and home rule. Will HMRC collect income tax for us then send it back?
In the US each state is free to make whatever laws it wishes, including on taxes, as long as they are conform to the US constitution and meet with democratic approval. But there you have it, the missing piece that would make sense of the British polity – a written constitution. That’s the elephant in the corner. Traditionally Britain has had a suspicion of written constitutions for the precise reason that everybody else likes them – because they are a check on the power of the executive.
Thank you for the comment. I shall reflect on your observation on sentence structure; it is a sobering corrective to any complacency I may have indulged following the too kind response of ‘bowanarrow’!
I do not wish to follow that remark up by trying to ‘score points’; I feel the tendency to do so damages the flow/value of debates in these columns, and is too readily used; so perhaps we are not referring to the same Simon Jenkins article? In any case, regarding DevoMax, on 17th December Jenkins writes: “Relations between Scotland and England will never settle until an agreed constitutional autonomy – “devo max” or “indie-lite” – is formally in place”.
Best wishes to all contributors for Christmas and the New Year.
John – thanks for your article. Since others have mentioned it, I’ll just say that the language is highly latinate and that’s absolutely fine. I wouldn’t bother (despite your gentle ironic reply) about anyone who is concerned about your expression and ”sentence structure”(!) nor from another who is a stranger to the use of conjunctions.
You speak interestingly of ”The British “imperial secret” ”. I’d simply say that the secret is that Scots have been essential in running that empire despite being part of ‘Lesser Britain”.
Spooky, isn’t it?
I will comment that your interesting article has the flavour of history from above, of ‘great men’ deciding the fate of Britannia and nations; a little more recognition of the role of the wealth producers – the people – might have been helpful.
Above, you often quote Dicey, though to a Scot his comments are devalued if not irrelevant for he tiresomely conflates ‘England’ and ‘Britain’, which always grates, does it not? His English exceptionalism is unaware of events in 1603 and 1707 and is thus fatally undermined, at least in ‘Lesser Britain’.
Totally agree on your point about ‘history from above’. That said, constitutional and legal history are necessarily largely written from above, due to those fields concerning books, negotiations etc that are commonly hidden from the ordinary people or – as we know – misrepresented to them by their rulers.
On quoting Dicey – my interpretation was that John was using Dicey precisely because the latter’s constitutional and cultural absolutism forces him the unwanted logical outcome of offering support for independence. Dicey is useful because he’s hateful. Or, to be exact, because he is both principled and hateful.
In similar logic, the importance of Scots in running the empire was (is?) not in spite of being part of ‘Lesser Britain’, but because of it. Empires and emperors from ancient China onward have understood ‘divide and rule’ not in the petty sense of dividing a single enemy into factions, but in the sense of offering a real improvement in life prospects to some of the most ‘loyal’ of the conquered peoples. Thus in the British context Scots loyal to the Union crown were central in administering eighteenth to early twentieth century Wales, whilst Welshmen whose religious nonconformity made them suspect at home were central in running the slave trade prior to American independence.
Hence Cardiff’s Butetown, Strathnairn Street, Ninian Road, Glenroy Street etc etc, and the large number of black Americans called Jones and Davis and Williams.
A final question for John. It’s serious, not rhetorical, incidentally: Why include the word ‘slow’ in your final summation? I presume there’s a reason – everything else in the article has a logic to it – but it doesn’t look to me like you’ve explained it. Thank you for the article.
Your points are well made. Why do I think the death of Lesser Britain is slow?
First, I think it fair to describe the Scottish people generally as being essentially (small ‘c’) “conservative”, whatever their politics. I do not believe this will change, therefore it is important to maintain an agreed, incremental momentum drawing in support from Scots from the widest spectrum of political thought; save only those who will never change, many of whom are probably at heart unreconciled even to the continuation of Holyrood. This approach just recognises what I would term the required ‘suasive realpolitik’ in order to succeed, and the limitations.
Second, the Scottish Enlightenment reflects an interpretation of the world that has had a long an powerful influence, casting its remarkable shadow over thought, society and politics in Scotland over almost three centuries; it is perhaps best described as offering a theory of change based on ‘evolutionary gradualism’.
Indeed, even Scotland’s ‘left’ radicalism is relatively conservative; only in Scotland would the most articulate political radicals of the early 20th century typically turn out to be teetotal, pacifist, schoolteachers; or the stoutest practical radicals prove to be ordinary mothers organising rent-strikes in the First World War, or running ‘socialist Sunday-schools’.
I believe the 45% result in the Referendum was an astonishing success in Scotland, far beyond my expectations of what might be achieved two years ago; it marked a watershed moment, a turning-point in the appetite for politics and for change in Scotland. This success was critically important and should not be forgotten. The work has begun, but it is not finished. Therefore I believe the ‘disappointment’ felt about the result, while understandable for some, is unnecessary. If there is to be reflection on the immediate past the focus should be on what has been achieved, and much more important, on the potential; what can yet be achieved, without being side-tracked into unrealistic short-term expectations that will not be met. Thus, the underlying instinct for ‘gradualism’ in Scotland will not, I believe, change significantly. The direction of travel nevertheless has been set, and the long term decline of Britain is now better understood in Scotland.
Incidentally, I hesitate to refer to Wales as the scope of my knowledge is limited; but I think the Earl of Bute achieved his influence there by marrying the largest coal-fortune in Britain.
You are quite correct, my apologies. Caused by not having a paper version in front of me and having to juggle between screens. Or else from memory. But the gist of his article is that he conflates devo max and indy lite with federalism despite apparently understanding federalism. It’s a sincere attempt to understand us, but it just does show how little people down south understand about devolution. In fact, I’m not sure how much Scots understand devolution; this was a point made by Smith.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79417/Scotland_analysis_Devolution_and_the_implications_of_Scottish_Independan…__1_.pdf
Crawford and Boyle in Annex A above follow Dicey in his view of the incorporating union, which incorporated Scotland, apparently, but not England!
An interesting adjunct to the Liberal Unionists like Seeley were the Liberal Imperialists like Lord Rosebery who believed in Home Rule All Round. This saw the British Empire as a liberal progressive force a kind of brotherhood of man which was capable of delivering autonomy to all in its fold once they had reached political maturity. They argued for Home Rule for India as well as Ireland and Scotland. Their vision was never achieved but something like it did materialise in the form of the British Commonwealth.
I am delighted you raised Crawford and Boyle, which I think may be considered an essentially unconvincing ‘opinion’; and since it is the official British government position it raises the perhaps unkind thought; is that the best they can do? The Crawford and Boyle ‘opinion’ has been rejected by Scheffer and by Douglas-Scott, who also refers to Sir David Edwards.
I forgot to add this on Dicey, which reflects also on Crawford and Boyle. This is what Dicey actually writes of the 1707 Act of Union:
“Up to the year 1707 there existed an English Parliament sovereign in England, and there existed a Scotch Parliament sovereign in Scotland. These two sovereign bodies in negotiating the Treaty of Union acted with scrupulous, and on the Scotch side with punctilious, independence. Neither sovereign body would consent to be absorbed in the other.
What they did agree to was to constitute a new State, namely, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and each to surrender their separate sovereignty in favour of a new sovereign, namely, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. The English Parliament no more became supreme in Scotland than the Scotch Parliament became supreme in England. The old Parliament of each country abdicated and lost its identity in the New Parliament of Great Britain.” (Ch.VII, p.244)
Thanks Nosuch for your many interesting points which I will chew over – but will spare you my conclusions as over these days I will ‘have drink taken’.
On divide and rule -you say ”Thus in the British context Scots loyal to the Union crown were central in administering eighteenth to early twentieth century Wales,” . I didnt know this about Wales -among many things I didnt know.Thanks. ‘Sic a parcel o’ rogues…’ we are. I did know about Churchill ordering non Scots troops into Glasgow to threaten the people.
”the importance of Scots in running the empire was (is?) not in spite of being part of ‘Lesser Britain’, but because of it.” . Yes indeed.
You say ”Dicey is useful because he’s hateful.” Yes, in the way that Urdu speaking Enoch Powell is useful – he has values even if they are repugnant. So did Thatcher who did what she did.
However, this I cannot thole, ”Empires and emperors from ancient China onward have understood ‘divide and rule’ not in the petty sense of dividing a single enemy into factions, but in the sense of offering a real improvement in life prospects to some of the most ‘loyal’ of the conquered peoples.”
Nosuch, do you really think that the British occupied (say) India, that ‘jewel in the crown’ for the good of the people? To improve their life prospects? Really?
Let me cite an example; in my father’s city of birth, Calcutta, a British induced famine in 1943 caused the death of 3 million, to the indifference of that great Empire loving hero, Churchill. Anecdotally, I’ve seen the Scots tea plantations in and around Darjeeling, but it would be impossible to convince me that these plantations were for the benefit of the occupied peoples. Imperialism is the most ferocious form of capitalism is it not? Even capitalists would agree.
Mother Teresa and Empire have long been exposed as frauds – I can’t believe that you subscribe to the ‘benefits’ of occupation.
Personally I am expecting 30+ SNP MP’s next May to tell them where to go. Then they can have their “solemn and very British ritual”.
Wow. Not an easy read! I was very tempted to take up a sub-editor’s blue pencil and simplify those long meandering – yet also poetic – sentences. But I think I get the gist.
The British establishment-state simply cannot evolve, despite appearances to the contrary that may have impressed less attentive observers (i.e. most of us!). It cannot mature in the way called for to address successfully 21st century relationships. This is true ‘both ways’: vis-à-vis Europe as well as vis-à-vis Scotland. It has learnt how to let go bits of the periphery when it has to, but it is in order to preserve inviolate Westminster’s sovereignty. The British State, having never undergone a true transforming shock in its heartland (like a 1789 for France, a long drawn-out war of independence for the Netherlands, a risorgimento for Italy… ) can’t find in itself those values required to build a lasting federal polity, one (like in Germany for instance) where power is distributed and respect is mutual.
”The British State, having never undergone a true transforming shock in its heartland”
Wouldn’t you count the ’45 rebellion or the (so called’) English Civil war or the Chartist Movement, Lawrence? The birth and growth of the Labour Party? The current Labour Party would however tend to confirm your point about inability to evolve, for the British State does endure, surviving the recent bid to change it.
None of these, I’d agree, had the impact of the French Revolution, but they did transform.
The English Civil War was almost 60 years before the British state existed, although it was some 40 years after the union of crowns.
Well maybe not, Dean. The Kingdom of Great Britain was formed in 1603 under a Scots king as Head of State(s) as you know.
And the ‘English’ Civil war started in Scotland.
See The Wars of the Three Kingdoms.
Bothy, the Civil War was certainly decisive in that it assured the ascendency of Parliament. Royal autocracy would never prevail again (contrary to neighboring France – where it survived, so that the resulting later explosion was bigger). And I guess 1688 cemented the edifice. But I don’t see it as a true transforming shock. Our Parliament has spent the better part of 800 years accruing power to itself (from above) while giving away as little as possible (to below), which makes it so damn hard for the House of Commons to even envisage an elected second chamber that would leach some power away from itself. Yet for the Union to survive there must be a more federal dispensation, so we are stuck.
I wouldn’t consider the Chartists transformative, compared to what happened in 1848 elsewhere in Europe, but the rise of Labour Party is a good candidate, its true. And yet….. look at today’s Britain.
new subj:
JSW – don’t take all these grumbles about your literary style to heart! OK, some of it ain’t exactly pellucid, but see how much interest you have aroused. As another commentator wrote, this is an article worth re-reading. It made us think. In terms of content, it is one of the best that Bella Caledinia has carried in a long time. Well done!
I’m sceptical of the idea that the Labour Party qua party changed anything substantially. Had it retained its embryo form as a ‘representation committee’ rather than becoming a conventional political party by the vote of its MPs alone after the 1906 election then we might have expected serious constitutional change from it. In fact, Labour politicians – with a vanishingly small number of honourable exceptions – have been less imaginative and radical (in terms of policy as well as constitution) than any of their opponents for most of the party’s history. Except when persecuting the left, which the Labour Party has often been very proud to do on behalf of the Conservative Party and the media.
Thanks Lawrence,
but this is a puzzle – ”Our Parliament has spent the better part of 800 years accruing power to itself ”.
Who is ”OUR Parliament’ of 800 years? There has maybe been an English Parliament for 800 years, but not a British Parliament, which came into being in 1707. Perhaps your North American perspective has distorted your view on history, absorbing English rather than British history. No worries, it’s quite a common misperception. It’s your loss.
Yes I agree the Chartists were not transformative, sadly. Like Occupy Wall Street, it was not a political party and was doomed to failure, despite its great ideals.
You say ”we are stuck.”. No Lawrence, we are not and that’s the whole point is it not? Fatalism is not a Scots trait.
On ”Royal autocracy”- I prefer the French solution…it is unambiguous…..
Well, you are right of course. By “our Parliament” I was thinking as an Englishman. And it is as English that we are stuck. The Scots are luckier. You are not.
In summary I am a reluctant Yesser. I would fain see a Union that survives but I know that for it to do so, the Westminster establishment must find in itself the ability to think big, to decentralize, to cede power to an elected second chamber… and it just cannot. The WM establishment is both rigid and I think in last resort brittle. Not to mention deeply corrupted (vide the paedophilia + cover-up scandal ongoing 30 years – what a stench of putrefaction that throws off). In fact ever since 1776, whenever the Empire was faced with the choice of sharing power or ceding territory, WM chose the latter.
So I believe independence for Scotland is but a matter of time, and (being 1/4 Scot also!) I wish Scotland well.. Happy New Year to all!
Definitely not an easy read, in fact, it will have to be re-read several times. There is a certain magnetism about the piece which demands a return. A nut shell was mentioned, I would have liked a pointer as to the writers take on Lesser Britain’s final chapter; how long will the death throes of the Empire last and when will Scotland finally ‘withdraw’?
Gibbons you ain’t.
“But the power of instruction is seldom of much efficacy, except in those happy dispositions where it is almost superfluous.”
Oh dear. I found this really heavy going. I persevered but wonder how many people gave up after a few paragraphs. I think I understood what the author was conveying in this article but would it not have been better to write in a style that can be understood and appreciated by a wider audience? This literary ‘showboating’ may be appreciated by a few but will certainly annoy or worse still be ignored by the majority. I think this would have benefited from a peer review before being published, but judging by the authors response to some of the constructive criticism, doesn’t seem to be welcome.
I am sorry you feel my response to constructive criticism was to consider it unwelcome; I was attempting to convey the opposite impression. I am disappointed that you thought I was ‘showboating’.
In one of your responses you said “I do not wish to follow that remark up by trying to ‘score points’;” which to me implies being followed by a big BUT. Maybe it is just the way you write, but that is the impression I get.
If you examine the exchanges with ‘MBC’ I think you will find that there was confusion over what Simon Jenkins had actually written on DevoMax; which we satisfactorily resolved.
The negative comments to JSW are unkind, and are there simply because some want their reading to be predigested, needing no effort to absorb.
I for one did not at all think that you were ‘showboating’. That remark says more about John’s insecurity than your article. And no need for a ‘peer review ‘ to determine if John could read it without effort. The ‘Sun’ has a reading age of 12 – this blog is better than that.
So you did actually score some points then.
No, I did not. My original statement can be taken at face value. Whether Simon Jenkins had discussed DevoMax was actually a matter of real substance to the discussion. I think that is quite clear from the exchanges. While I am keen to be helpful, I can say little more on this subject.
John, There’s also this refutation of Crawford and Boyle.
http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/08/12/lril.lru007.full.pdf
There seems to be a common thread in the responses made by at least 5 people and one other who had his comment removed (not sure why) that this is ” Not an easy read! “. Maybe Bothy Basher has come up with the thing that links us in that we all have a reading age of 12.
I think I’ll stop thrashing now as the horse seems to be dead.
Apologies I said thrashing when I should have said flogging, as in flogging a dead horse.
Thanks John! – which would you prefer? a thrashing or a flogging?
Well John, the first thing to do is relax.
The article was thoughtfully written and generously contributed here – and the writer got personal abuse for it. I object to that – I ask you criticise the content only and avoid ad hominem attacks. That’s normal isn’t it?
You say that 5 people were grumpy about the article which doesnt make them right, but it does make them rude if they moan that it was too difficult for them. A fine way for you to encourage the contribution of items to Bella!
Try to see beyond your individual struggle to understand – if it was too much for you, then move on. Look around for an ‘easy read’. I could suggest a few if you ask; look at the the excellent images of Greg Moodie. . My reference to the Sun’s reading age was directed at 1 of the 5 commenters as you well know, and not a million miles from your good self.
I agree you’re right to stop thrashing about.
JSW – excellent article! Thank you!
Interesting, but an incorporating union is precisely what was not agreed in the 1707 Treaty of Union. That is the root of the Empire Loyalists’ dilemma. For Scotland has a different legal system from England and Wales, and that is why, for example, Cameron and his xenophobes cannot take Scotland out of Europe against our will. If England wished to leave the European Union, she would have to secede from the United Kingdom first.
Thank you for a fascinating and thought provoking essay, which is surely one of the best in recent times.
To my mind, British/English assimilation/Anglicisation is merely intentional discrimination against Scots and Scotland by the larger partner in the UK joint venture state. The BBC and MSM have arguably been the main assimilation vehicles and continue this agenda. But far too many Scots (well, at least 45% who voted in the ref) have seen through it; new media offerings like Bella etc have helped greatly.
I doubt that ‘Ulsterization’ could occur in Scotland because the Act of Union confirmed Scotland (and indeed many Scots regard themselves and Scotland) as an equal partner nation in the Union, not as a province or colony. The Act of Union signed by Scots MP’s in 1707 reminds Scots of our equal status. Whilst our legislature was dissolved, as was England’s, our nation was not. As you mentioned, this is not really understood in England, even in 10 Downing St.
As for former colonies that became independent, I think Scotland is not comparable to any. While some Anglo-‘Scorpions’ may claim that Scotland was incorporated, the Act of Union makes it clear this was not the case. To extend corporate analogies, the UK is a ‘joint-venture’ state comprising two principal partners – England and Scotland. As most business analysts know, in JV’s there may be one partner more solvent than the other at any given time. However the key factor in JV survival is to what extent all ‘partners’ continue to derive benefits from the JV. If ‘returns’ (not only financial) fall below acceptable levels for one or both partners then the JV will come to an end. If the JV vehicle is bust it will likewise be dissolved. It is possible of course for one JV partner to acquire the other partner; that would then be ‘incorporation’ or ‘absorption’. In that case the incorporated/absorbed entity would cease to exist. Clearly Scotland has not been ‘acquired’ and is unlikely ever to be so, despite the fact that some Scots politicians accepted bribes for their votes in 1707, though that is another (criminal) matter entirely.
Doubtless the scorpion will still be there whichever route we Scots take to liberty, whether that be a referendum or even a rapid declaration of independence by the 30+ SNP MP’s next May. As your essay illustrates, Parliamentary sovereignty is all Imperial Britain understands, and the union could and perhaps should be ended the same way it was formed – i.e. by majority vote of Scots MP’s, hopefully next May.
Britannia cannot ‘sail away’ from Scotland, as implied, however. As Britannia consists, in large part, of Scotland as one of the two principal JV partners, the latter’s exit from UK union means, finally, the end of Imperial Britain.
John S W, I just wanted to thanks you for this and other articles which I much appreciate and to wish you and all your readers a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year 🙂
Nosuchthingasthemarket
December 26, 2014 • 18:15
I’m sceptical of the idea that the Labour Party qua party changed anything substantially. Had it retained its embryo form as a ‘representation committee’ rather than becoming a conventional political party by the vote of its MPs alone after the 1906 election then we might have expected serious constitutional change from it. In fact, Labour politicians – with a vanishingly small number of honourable exceptions – have been less imaginative and radical (in terms of policy as well as constitution) than any of their opponents for most of the party’s history. Except when persecuting the left, which the Labour Party has often been very proud to do on behalf of the Conservative Party and the med”
Nosuch, the Labour Party has made many advances for wealth producers before it abandoned Clause 4 and became New Labour. Yes it has sold out. Yes.
” Had it retained its embryo form as a ‘representation committee’ rather than becoming a conventional political party….Had it retained its embryo form as a ‘representation committee’ rather than becoming a conventional political party …..”.
Nosuch, this is daft. Who taught you history – Dick Cheney?
What an orgy of language ‘fookwithery’! Interesting read, some impressive research in play, but surely a turn-off for many? In reading it, I felt like the author was self-flagellating while typing with one finger…!
On the plus side for me, some compelling parallels with the historical record.
I could not do better, I only offer opinion. There is surely a balance to be struck between this historian prose (so typified by folk like Brian Sewell in ‘wanky’ art documentaries) and plain english, which would work well but perhaps be more easily digested?
Looking forward to May, anyhow! 🙂
Wonderful lexis from you Rose, beginning with ‘orgy’ and ending in ‘wanky’. Your comment is indeed an orgy of one. Enjoy! and thanks! Keep on tickling your qwerty……
JSW: a last word ref. style…
Bothy is right. We have grown too used to easy pre-digested reads…
Because you aroused my interest with this concept of ‘Ulszerisation’ I looked up Bourke’s article on Pocock and the pre-suppositions of British History. It was on sale for £20 which I thought a bit steep. So I actually tracked Richard Bourke down (he has moved from Queens Univ London to Berlin) and emailed him to ask him for a less expensive way to read it. He promptly and generously sent me a copy.
Now believe me, THAT is a tough read, if anybody has the fortitude!! Good, though. After getting through that, I have nothing but admiration for the way you have summarized his argument, elegantly.
Happy New Year!
What a lovely outcome! Not only searching out the key article, but contacting the writer to do so, and receiving such a swift and generous response at Christmas! That is just the best Christmas present I could possibly imagine. Thank you. Happy New Year everyone…. …. …. yipeeeee!
Not sure if it’s the same article but Bourke’s 2010 article on Pocock and the Presuppositions of the New British History, is freely available online as a PDF.
Thanks for pointing people towards Bourke’s article which I’ve just finished reading. What’s interesting for me is seeing how Ulsterization manifests in relation to Scotland. We saw it most blatantly in the referendum over the issue of the common currency. No middle way could be possible. Scotland either had to stay in the union on Westminster’s terms or be cast out completely. In other words Westminster reverted to the only response it could to an attempt to reconfigure relations on this island by preferring instead to cast off the offending province. As Seeley said the centre cannot see the periphery as part of itself but instead sees it as possessions to be disposed of when there is any threat to the maintenance of things as they are at Westminster. As Macwhirther says in his new book, it was at that moment many Scots saw the real nature of Scotland’s relationship to the British State, and Dicey’s sham constitution lost its power to deflect us away from seeing the true underlying nature of the British power. It’s also useful to see how this relates to British euro-scepticism. Useful because it’s through comparison with other states that Britain’s peculiarity becomes evident. All the members of the EU have had to pool sovereignty, the fact that it is only in Britain that the debate on this has become so fetishized on parliamentary sovereignty and the solution is seen as cutting off the contaminating connection. This is why Nicola Sturgeon is so right to concentrate on this issue because it demonstrates the central problem facing Scotland which is that we are signed up to a polity which is at variance with the modern world.
”it demonstrates the central problem facing Scotland which is that we are signed up to a polity”
Yes Alex. We are signed up.
A thoughtful response (I agree with much of it) which if you’ll excuse me for saying, has a thread running through it of Scots as victims.
It’s not so. We are where we are because though we may not like it, that’s what we voted for.