Under what circumstances would the SNP-Green government trigger a Holyrood Special Election in defence of devolution?

The next in Gordon Guthrie’s mini-series exploring the routes and tactics towards independence ahead of the SNP conference.

Question 3: Under what circumstances would the SNP-Green government trigger a Holyrood Special Election in defence of devolution?

The Scottish Parliament is impregnable – can’t be attacked or defanged.

First Past The Post produces wipeout elections which smash the constitutional order: the 1918 general election in Ireland, the February 1974 Westminster election where 11 out of 12 seats went to anti-powersharing ultras with 51% of the vote: constitutional collapse, continued violence, death and misery for 25 years.

We have had three of these: in 2017, 2017 and 2019. We want Holyrood, with First Past The Post at Westminster our opponents need it, well our opponents in Scotland need it.

There is a tension that is tearing particularly the Scottish Tories apart – a tension between MSPs who are existentially committed to Holyrood and MPs who are meh.

Without a Scottish Parliament, the SNP becomes again the trinity of the only scottish party, the only national party, the Scottish National Party – the Scottish opposition just dusty wikipedia pages.

In this context Section 3 (1) (b) of the Scotland Act 1998 becomes critical. If a majority government resigns, doesn’t put up an FM candidate and votes down the opposition then there will be an extraordinary General Election.

Be under no illusion, this is not a quick route to referendum. 3 (1) (b) would be a bloody and prolonged process and leave Scotland effectively government less for an extended period. Embarking on it for party advantage during a poly-crisis would be disastrous and would be punished by the voters. As a step to get a referendum it would be suicidal, as a defensive mechanism it still might be.

Attempts by Westminster to chip away at Holyrood need to be resisted. If the Supreme Court decides our way and Westminster brings in a blocking bill – Section 3 (1) (b). It remains unlikely they would. Liz Truss’s comments this week about no referendum under any circumstances sounded more like a robotic repetition of a line than a firm statement of legislative intent.

But that is not the only circumstance where is raises its ugly head.

When Stormont was abolished in 1972 the worry was 2 legislative programmes would swamp Westminster. The Secretary of State got decree powers, Orders in Council, to legislate for NI. This was temporary for a year, but soon permanent.

Decree powers in NI went to a single minister with a dedicated territorial department, which contained in its multitudes the whole of the old NI civil service. Delicate and substantial things were done: abolishing the right to silence, privatising Harland and Wolff. There was civil service continuity.

Leaving the EU brought the same dilemma – how to handle the workload of the European Parliament – and the same temporary decree powers.

The Westminster cabinet is a hodgepodge of UK, GB, E&W and English territorial departments. And so these new decree powers have been handed out like sweeties across them all.

Kwarteng yoloed off a cliff, image a bus load of Kwartengs primed and ready to go-lo.

A random Westminster department, operating in ignorance but good faith, could yolo an explosive political decree at any time. That is what lack of scrutiny does. A Section 3 (1) (b), an extraordinary General Election, could come from nowhere. We maun be ready.