Economic Security, and Security without Economics

Both the British and Scottish economies are struggling to produce economic growth, in spite of the proclaimed aspirations of both. In the predicament Britain finds itself in 2026 there are few upsides left to find. In the new geopolitics of America’s rediscovered but essentialist isolationism, which is less a bizarre passing phenomenon than a reminder of older, deeper United States themes; but themes Britain finds to difficult to contemplate. Britain is the worst affected politically and psychologically by the American recalibration, of all the NATO allies, because more than anyone in NATO, Britain’s convinced illusions in a false, complacent narrative have been most enduring, and most relied on by British Governments and commentariat for both security, and its geopolitical prospects.

In a world of competing economic blocs, of war-driven supply-chain crises of globalism; and specifically for Britain; which has an economy based on energy imports at international market prices, and possesses a catastrophic hole in its trade left by the post-Brexit fall-out, the IMF has now pronounced on this cocktail of toxic problems: “On 14 April 2026, the IMF published new forecasts for the world economy. The IMF forecast slower growth and higher inflation as a result of the conflict in the Middle East and the disruption to energy supply. The OECD lowered its forecast for UK GDP growth in 2026 from 1.3% to 0.8%. It also forecast UK inflation to average 3.2% in 2026.” (House of Commons Library). The IMF Forecast for the Eurozone GDP Growth is 1.1%.

The OECD has also given its verdict: “On 26 March 2026, the OECD published new forecasts for the world economy. The OECD raised its forecast for inflation around the world due to the conflict in the Middle East and the disruption to energy supply. The OECD lowered its forecast for UK GDP growth in 2026 from 1.2% to 0.7%. It also raised its forecast for UK inflation in 2026 from 2.5% to 4.0%” (House of Commons Library)

Deep in this darkest of self-created black-holes, nurtured by illusions nurtured for decades, and believed to be forever; in the middle of a cost-of-living crisis still not fixed, and with the tax burden on ordinary people unrelenting; the aspiration of growth, is still somehow to be created by entrepreneurs ex-nihilo. Since Britain couldn’t deliver any growth or investment in Britain in fourteen years, under a supposed growth-motivated Conservative Government, with interest rates long held at the lower bound, this is a problematic ambition (the Bank of England held interest rates at 0.5%, or below effectively from 2009-2022). Capital still didn’t invest in Britain. The task is clearly difficult, if not impossible (short of throwing the population to the wolves), unless there is an opportunity. And Britain is an opportunity deprived place; largely subject to Chinese, or American technology (often monoplies), and in the case of British business, too many are privatised monopolies that have failed disastrously, but are protected by TPTF political protocols.

Scotland faces the same problem, but its bitter experience is notable for highlighting the nature of the underlying problem (Catch 22); which for Scotland is serious. The Case in point is the proposed £1.5Bn investment by the Chines Ming-Yang Corporation in a renewables turbine plant planned for Ardeseir (a brownfield site of the old oil boom). The investment was rejected by the British government on security grounds. There will always be a serious case for security scrutiny of major Chinese technology investments, because China is an extremely advanced country in digital networks, and the relationship between private capital and the State in China need scarcely be rehearsed (China has demonstrated how, uniquely the Chinese Communist State has been able to exploit the capacity and potential of capitalism to the full, and better than most). China has also become the leading developer of renewable technology in the world; it has no oil.

Chinese firm Ming Yang has been blocked by the UK Government from building what would have been the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturing facility in Scotland.

UK Government blocks Chinese firm’s plan for world’s largest wind turbine factory in Scotland | STV News

The British Government has not, however chosen to explain the specific reasons why Ming-Yang is uniquely dangerous to British security, save that it is an infrastructure threat. The Scottish Government has not, apparently been informed. The reason the security issue in Scotland is particularly important is twofold.

First, several major Chinese infrastructure or otherwise critical (to infrastructure) projects have been passed on security grounds elsewhere. They include a Chinese stake of around 27% in the vast Hinkley Point C Nuclear Plant (£48Bn cost estimate, and higher electricity prices to follow); Heathrow (with a £49Bn expansion plan, is 10% owned by China Investment Consortium). The Chinese Super-embassy has passed security checks, although it is located close to British digital infrastructure. Most solar panels in the UK are manufactured in China (perhaps 70%). A Hong-Kong based firm owns UK Power Networks, which runs electricity distribution networks in London, South-East, and East of England. The Beatrice offshore wind farm, Caithness is 25% owned by a Chinese state-owned company. The list is long.

It appears, speculatively the security services have decided Yang-Ming is a special threat, providing access both to British infrastructure and defence, and particularly (or presumably) through access to the Scottish Marine geology, bathymetry and hydrography. This may be true, but sits a little uncomfortably with the access given to China elsewhere, across the board. It is especially difficult for Scotland, when it impacts so directly on the development of the Scottish renewables sector.

Second, and worse, the project is rejected, but no alternative is offered. Scotland is under pressure to grow the economy, not least by the British Government and media, but it is actually under a countervailing British demand. Scotland is expected to exist primarily in a British context, as a passive platform protecting British security (from Faslane to the Shetlands), and simply eschew development and growth, for no return or reward; but simply to serve the interests of British security, and the greater good, which others are better placed to enjoy the rewards.

It will be argued that one project in Ardeseir doesn’t make a case. But this expectation, a passive Scotland that accepts the avoidance of economic growth for a British security purpose, is well established. In the 1980s, the Clyde estuary was established as having serious potential for oil development. For example, the Clyde Field is illustrative (‘Development of the Oil and Gas Resources’; Department of Energy, April 1985), which establishes acknowledgement that the production licenses had been picked up: “During 1984 five production licences were awarded for areas in the Firth of Clyde”, and elsewhere p.5).

Both BP and BNOC were interested in developing the potential, and a license was sought. The story can be found here, from which this is an extract: “A licence gives the holder exclusive rights to explore in an area for a certain period and BP held this licence for four years from 6th April 1984 until April 1988. During that time they collected the seismic data and analysed the results. We obtained some of that data, although it was previously thought to have been lost. We can confirm that there is a large structure there that would be a good target for exploration. Despite this when the licence period came to an end BP and Britoil relinquished the licence. No wells were ever drilled in the region and it is possible that the prospect was considered to be too high risk or too small to warrant a well, especially since gas is more likely than oil. Recently de-classified documents suggest that BP’s reasons for giving up on the area were not necessarily related to the geological risks of the project. The MOD who had two submarine bases in the region, Faslane and the American Holy Loch, were not keen to allow other activates in the region that might interfere with their clandestine activities. The prospect sits directly below the deepest part of the main navigation channel between Arran and the mainland” ( ‘Opinion: Potential on the Clyde’;‘Energy Voice’, 16th September, 2014).

It appears that it was only in 2014 that the relevant facts were “declassified”. It may well be that in every case an argument can be made to sacrifice economics for national security; but there comes a point that Scotland simply cannot grow, if there is always a British reason that Scotland’s economy must be sacrificed, and Scotland carries the burden of the nation’s security. And yet Scotland is expected to grow, nevertheless, whatever hidden trip-wires are thrown in its path, and delivered in secret. Let us be clear, there has been no provision made from elsewhere adequately to compensate for Scotland continually failing to benefit from the economic opportunities it is obliged to give up. In renewables, they are costing us dearly in many different ways.

There comes a point when it is time to ask; how much is Scotland expected to give up, how many opportunities discarded? For what? For whom? We simply cannot go on like this.